
When government draws vast “no-carry” perimeters around everyday civic life, the people most committed to showing up—in this case, Orthodox Jews who walk to synagogue on the Sabbath—often shoulder the sharpest burdens; a recent federal injunction in Maryland shows how post-Bruen law is forcing governments to justify such lines with history, not just aspiration.
The Short Version
- A federal judge preliminarily enjoined Montgomery County from enforcing its gun ban inside a specific synagogue, finding a likely Second Amendment violation as applied to those plaintiffs.
- The county’s broader 100-yard/300-foot buffer around “places of public assembly” remains in force for now, creating a practical obstacle for observant congregants who walk to services.
- The dispute sits squarely in the post-Bruen shift: sensitive-place designations now live or die on historical analogues rather than generalized public-safety aims.
- The county defends its perimeters as targeted public-safety rules authorized by state law and refined with exceptions, not religion-specific burdens.
What the court actually did—and why it matters
The Silver Spring Jewish Center and its rabbi challenged Montgomery County’s rule that prohibits possessing or transporting firearms “in or within 100 yards of a place of public assembly,” a definition that includes houses of worship. The district court granted a preliminary injunction allowing the synagogue’s named plaintiffs to carry inside their house of worship, concluding they were likely to succeed on their as-applied Second Amendment claim. Preliminary relief is not a final merits judgment, but it signals the court’s view that, under Bruen’s history-and-tradition test, the government’s case for a categorical ban inside this worship space was unlikely to prevail when applied to these plaintiffs at this stage. The court left the perimeter rule intact for now, a partial win that frames the next battle: the legality of broad buffer zones that make walking to services with a lawfully carried handgun effectively impossible for observant Jews who do not drive on the Sabbath.
Two features made the synagogue’s showing concrete. First, the county’s line-drawing extended beyond interiors to a protective halo around “public assembly,” sweeping in the sidewalks and routes congregants must traverse. Second, the court contrasted the county’s treatment of volunteers versus licensed professionals—questioning why trained, vetted congregants guarding their own flock were necessarily riskier than an exempted hired guard, a gap that undermined the county’s tailoring for this as-applied context.
How Bruen changes the playbook for “sensitive places”
Before Bruen, courts routinely upheld gun restrictions under interest balancing: if lawmakers plausibly advanced public safety, deference often followed. Bruen replaced that with a historical test. Governments now must show that modern restrictions are consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation—not merely that they serve salutary ends. That has made sensitive-place litigation more granular. Courthouses and polling places usually survive; blanket bans in houses of worship have faced stiffer headwinds unless supported by enduring historical analogues across relevant periods. Where perimeters are added—100 yards in Montgomery County’s current text, historically varied in other jurisdictions—the state’s evidence must connect those buffer zones to well-established historical practice, not just policy preference.
That is the backdrop here. The synagogue secured interior relief on an as-applied basis; the county’s buffer survived, for now. As the record develops, the question is not whether the county values safety—it plainly does—but whether its chosen lines track an American tradition specific enough to justify banning carry on the walk to and from worship. That is a narrower, more exacting inquiry than public debate often recognizes.
Mechanics of the Montgomery County rule
The county code prohibits selling, transferring, possessing, or transporting a handgun, rifle, shotgun, ammunition, or major firearm component in or within 100 yards of a “place of public assembly,” a definition that includes houses of worship, parks, schools, libraries, polling places, and legislative assemblies. The county narrowed earlier drafts by removing some facilities already covered by state law and created a roadway exception for people driving through the buffer on public highways or roads—an accommodation that does little for pedestrians who cannot lawfully drive during observance. The synagogue’s challenge zeroes in on that lived reality: the buffer functions as a practical bar to lawful carry for those who walk to services, even when carry inside the sanctuary is permitted.
The county’s defense is straightforward and, on its own terms, respectable. Officials cite a legislative purpose to protect public-assembly spaces from gun violence and point to state authorization for charter counties to regulate within 100 yards of parks, churches, schools, and similar venues. They characterize the framework as a neutral, location-based safety measure refined with exceptions—not a religion-specific restraint. Whether that is constitutionally sufficient under Bruen’s historical analogue test is a question the federal litigation squarely tees up.
The live issues on appeal
After winning interior relief, the synagogue asked the Fourth Circuit to address the remaining pedestrian-distance restriction, advancing both the Second Amendment right to armed self-defense and a Free Exercise theory keyed to the distinct burdens on Orthodox practice. The appeal, docketed as No. 26-2623, puts front and center the question Bruen invites: are perimeter bans of this breadth around worship and other public-assembly spaces consistent with historical tradition, especially as applied to people for whom walking is a religious duty? The district court later denied a separate motion by the plaintiffs—an order that underscores the partial and preliminary nature of their victories to date and the need to resolve the contested perimeter on a fuller record.
Two evidentiary gaps could matter. First, while the litigation has played out amid widely reported increases in antisemitic threats, the record as surfaced publicly does not catalogue synagogue-specific incidents or official threat assessments. Second, the mapping problem is empirical: if every viable walking route crosses a buffer, the law’s practical effect is more severe than if lawful pathways exist. Appellate courts often look hard at such facts when assessing as-applied claims; the more concrete the burden, the stronger the case that a neutral rule, in operation, disables a core right.
What to watch as doctrine settles
Expect three lines of argument to shape the outcome. First, historical fit: the county will need durable analogues for both interior bans and perimeters; plaintiffs will argue that historical practice is thinner in houses of worship and even thinner for broad halos. The preliminary injunction suggests the county’s interior case is vulnerable as applied to trained congregational security. Second, tailoring versus neutrality: while the law is location-based and broadly framed, its practical effect on religious walkers distinguishes this dispute from the typical driving public. If the government can accommodate driving but not walking, a minimalist carve-out for recognized religious observance may become a focal remedy. Third, role of comparative risk: the district court already signaled skepticism that vetted volunteer teams at a house of worship are categorically riskier than licensed guards the county exempts; if that intuition hardens on a developed record, the county’s safety justification weakens in this as-applied setting.
None of this collapses into a referendum on all “gun-free” places. The court granted narrow relief to specific plaintiffs, in a specific venue, on a preliminary record. But the case is a bellwether. It illustrates how, after Bruen, governments must defend not the wisdom of a safety perimeter but its lineage—and how religious practice can transform what looks, on paper, like a neutral rule into a distinctive constitutional question when observance requires walking through a legal minefield to reach the sanctuary door.
Bottom line
The synagogue won the right, preliminarily, to protect itself inside; the county preserved, for now, the right to draw a line around it. The next ruling will test whether that line can lawfully block the faithful on their way to pray. On that question, history—not aspiration—will decide.
Sources:
reason.com, supreme.justia.com, courtlistener.com, thebanner.com, apps.montgomerycountymd.gov, govinfo.gov, mocoshow.com













